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The desirability of industrial policy in an economy with increasing returns to scale industries has
been on and off the research agenda’s of both academic economists and policy practitioners at least
since the debate in the 1920s between Frank Graham and Frank Knight (see Flam and Helpman
(1987) for references). With the advent of the so-called New Trade Theory (Krugman, 1990), the
debate has been given a new lease of life. At least two approaches can be distinguished in the
recent literature. The first approach, which is mentioned but not pursued in this paper, is better
known under the name of strategic trade policy.' In this branch of literature, the issue of
industrial policy is studied in a setting of large duopolistic or oligopolistic firms battling for market
share in the international economy (see Brander (1995) for an overview and references).
The second approach studies the issue of industrial policy in a world characterized by
monopolistic competition. In such a setting there is no strategic interaction between firms, and
trade in varieties of a differentiated product takes place between countries. Flam and Helpman
(1987), for example, construct a static model of a small open economy with a monopolistically
competitive production sector. They use the model to study the effects on allocation and welfare of
tariffs, export subsidies, R&D subsidies, and output subsidies. Flam and Helpman (1987, pp. 90-
91) identify three mechanisms by which welfare of domestic agents is increased in a
monopolistically competitive setting. First, an increase in the number of domestic product varieties
expands the range of choice by domestic consumers, who are better off as a result provided they
exhibit a preference for diversity. Second, a policy that increases the home price of domestically
produced varieties has a positive terms of trade effect which increases welfare of domestic
residents. Third, an increase in the output level per domestic firm constitutes a pro-competitive'
effect and thus increases welfare.
Our paper is a contribution to the second approach to industrial policy. Attention is
restricted to the import tariff. In the static model of Flam and Helpman, the introduction of a tariff
increases profits which prompts an increase in the number of domestic firms and raises the prices
charged by domestic firms. The effects on output per firm is ambiguous, but the terms of trade and
welfare of domestic residents both improve as a result (1987, pp. 91-92). Our first objective in this
paper is to further study the precise conditions under which an import tariff is welfare-improving.
Whilst we retain some of the modelling devices of Flam and Helpman (1987), we modify the
analysis in several directions.
One of our modifications is motivated by a recent body of literature in which it has been
shown that the conclusions based on static models can be highly misleading because the element of
-1-time is missing in such models. In a world populated with infinitely-lived representative' agents,
this is perhaps not such a problem, because the timing only affects when' (but not whether') the
agents bears the costs of, or receives the benefits from, a particular policy measure. In a world
with finitely-lived overlapping generations, however, the timing of the benefits and costs associated
with a particular policy becomes vital. In such a setting a policy measure typically affects both
existing and future generations differently, i.e. there are not only efficiency but also
intergenerational distribution effects that must be considered. Broer and Heijdra (1996), for
example, use a closed-economy model with monopolistic competition to show that stimulation of
production by means of an investment tax credit is feasible but gives rise to a highly uneven
distribution of costs and benefits over generations. In particular, they show that old existing
generations lose out because they suffer a capital loss on their share holdings, whereas younger
generations as well as future generations benefit as a result of the higher wages and larger number
of product varieties on the market. The importance of intergenerational distribution effects in
determining optimal' policy has been demonstrated in a small but growing number of papers on
very diverse topics.
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The second major objective of our paper is therefore to study the import tariff in a
dynamic overlapping-generations economy. We use the perpetual youth approach of Blanchard
(1985), but extend it to a small open economy and endogenize the labour supply decision of
households. Domestic households purchase domestic and foreign product varieties and use the
current account in order to smooth their consumption profiles. The country is small in world
financial markets and thus faces perfect capital mobility. The domestic real interest rate can vary in
the transition period, however, because of movements in the real exchange rate. There are many
small domestic firms producing varieties that are sold at home and abroad. Free exit/entry
eliminates excess profits in the domestic economy and determines the equilibrium number of firms.
Increasing returns to scale exist because an increase in the number of product varieties boosts the
productivity of the variable labour input.
The analysis yields a number of conclusions. First, in contrast to Flam and Helpman’s
(1987) findings, an increase in the tariff reduces output and employment, both in the short run and
in the long run. The reason is that in our model the tariff shock prompts a negative labour supply
response which leads to a reduction in the number of firms. Like Flam and Helpman (1987), we
find that the real exchange rate appreciates both at impact and in the long run.
Second, the import tariff affects generations unequally. Old existing generations gain less
welfare than younger existing generations and future generations. In terms of the basic mechanisms
identified by Flam and Helpman (1987), generations born in the new steady state lose welfare
-2-because the number of domestic product varieties falls, but gain welfare because of the
improvement in the terms of trade. Due to free entry/exit and the fixed markup, output per firm is
fixed and thus does not contribute towards welfare. A fourth mechanism operates in our model via
the stock of net foreign assets. It is shown that steady-state generations enjoy a net claim on the
rest of the world as a result of the increase in the tariff. This also exerts a positive effect on the
welfare of steady-state generations.
Third, our analysis shows that a suitable bond accompanying the tariff increase can
neutralize the intergenerational distribution effects so that the pure efficiency effects of the tariff
can be studied. In such an egalitarian setting it is possible to study the optimal tariff. It is shown
that the optimal tariff depends not only on national market power' (as in Gros (1987)) but also on
the pre-existing domestic distortion of monopolistic competition. To the extent that the policy
maker has no instrument to combat the domestic monopoly distortion (such as a product subsidy),
the second-best optimum tariff is reduced vis-à-vis its first-best value. Intuitively, output is already
too low due to the domestic monopoly distortion and increasing the tariff only exacerbates this
problem. In the absence of a domestic distortion and/or if the product subsidy is set optimally, the
first-best tariff is aimed at exploiting national market power to the fullest extent possible. Our
model thus yields precise and intuitively understandable prescriptions about the interaction between
the optimum tariff and pre-existing domestic distortions. In this sense it is related to the earlier
work by Johnson (1965) and Bhagwati (1967, 1971).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 the model of a small open
economy is developed. In section 3 the macroeconomic allocation effects of an import tariff are
studied, both at impact, during transition, and in the long run. Section 4 is dedicated to the welfare
analysis both without and with bond policy. Finally, section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2. A model of perpetual youth and imperfect competition
2.1. Households
The basic model of household behaviour builds on the work of Blanchard (1985) and the extension
to the open economy by Giovannini (1988). Beside the endogeneity of labour supply, the main
difference with these two models is the introduction of diversified consumption goods into the
utility function of the agents. This in turn opens the scope for imperfectly competitive behaviour
on the part of producers, which forms the major innovation of this paper.
In this model there is a fixed population of agents each facing a given constant probability
-3-of death. During their entire life agents have a time endowment of unity which they allocate over
labour and leisure. The utility functional at time t of the representative agent born at time v is
denoted by L(v,t) and has the following form:
where a is the pure rate of time preference (a>0), b is the probability of death (b³0), and U(v,t)i s




logU(v,t) exp(a b)(t t)d t,
sub-utility which depends on leisure, 1-L(v,t), and consumption of domestic and foreign composite
goods (CD(v,t) and CF(v,t), respectively):
with 0<g£1 and 0<gD<1.
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The domestic economy consists of imperfectly competitive firms that each produce a single
variety of a diversified good. These goods are close but imperfect substitutes in consumption.
Following Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) the diversified goods can be aggregated
over existing varieties (1,2,..,N(t)) in order to obtain CD(v,t):
where CD,i(v,t) is the consumption of domestically produced variety i in period t by an agent born


















in period v (£t), sC is the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced varieties of the
differentiated good, and h is a parameter regulating the preference for diversity effect. If h>1, the
individual agents exhibit a love of variety, and setting sC>1 ensures that all existing varieties will
in fact be demanded. For the imported composite consumption good the same specification is
chosen.
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where CF,j(v,t) is the consumption of foreign variety j and N
* is the (fixed) number of foreign


















varieties. The true price deflators corresponding to (2.3) and (2.4) are:





































real exchange rate is defined as E(t)ºPF(t)/PD(t).
The agent’s budget restriction in terms of the domestic price deflator PD(t) is equal to:
where A ˙(t)ºdA(v,t)/dt, r(t) is the real rate of interest on domestic assets, W(t) is the real wage rate
(2.6) ˙ A(v,t) r(t) b A(v,t) W(t)L(v,t) T(t) CD(v,t) E(t) 1 tM(t) CF(v,t),
(assumed age-independent for convenience), T(t) are net lump-sum taxes, tM(t)i sa nad valorem
import tariff, and A(v,t) are real tangible assets. All tangible assets are perfect substitutes:
where V(t)K(v,t) is the real market value of K(v,t) units of land in the hands of households of
(2.7) A(v,t) º B(v,t) V(t)K(v,t) E(t)F(v,t),
vintage v, B(v,t) is the real stock of government bonds, and F(v,t) denotes real net foreign assets
measured in terms of the foreign good. Full consumption X(v,t) is defined as the sum of real
consumption of the composite differentiated goods and the opportunity cost of leisure:
The domestic economy is small in world capital markets, so that the world real rate of
(2.8) X(v,t) º CD(v,t) E(t) 1 tM(t) CF(v,t) W(t) 1 L(v,t).
interest rF is fixed. The domestic real interest rate is then determined by the familiar no-arbitrage
condition:
where E ˙(t)ºdE(t)/dt.
(2.9) r(t) rF ˙ E(t)/E(t),
Due to the separable structure of preferences, the choice problem for the representative
agent can be solved in two steps. First, the dynamic problem is solved. This leads to an optimal
time profile for full consumption which is described by the agent’s Euler equation:




where gD thus represents the (constant) share of total goods consumption that is spent on domestic
-5-goods and 1-g is the spending share of leisure in full consumption.
4 Furthermore, the different
(2.11)
CD(v,t) ggDX(v,t), E(t) 1 tM(t) CF(v,t) g(1 gD)X(v,t),
W(t) 1 L(v,t) (1 g)X(v,t),
varieties of the domestically produced and imported goods are determined by:

































simple demographic structure, which enables the aggregation over all currently alive households.
Assuming that at each instance a large cohort of size bS is born and that bS agents die, and
normalising S to unity, the size of the population is constant and equal to unity and the aggregated
variables can be calculated as the weighted sum of the values for the different generations. For
example, aggregate financial wealth is calculated as A(t)ºò -¥
t bA(v,t)e
b(v-t)dv. The aggregated values
for the other variables can be obtained in the same fashion. The main equations describing the
behaviour of the aggregated household sector are given (for period t) by equations (T1.2) and
(T1.9) in Table 1. Equation (T1.2) is the aggregate Euler equation modified for the existence of
overlapping-generations of finitely-lived agents. It has the same form as the Euler equation for
individual households (equation (2.10)) except for the correction term due to the distributional
effects caused by the turnover of generations. Optimal consumption growth is the same for all
generations but older generations have a higher consumption level than younger generations.
5
Since existing generations are continually being replaced by newborns, who hold no financial
wealth, aggregate consumption growth is reduced somewhat as a result. The correction term
appearing in (T1.2) thus represents the difference in average full consumption and full consumption
by newborns:
6
where A(t)ºV(t)+E(t)F(t)+B(t) is aggregate financial wealth and the constant aggregate stock of
(2.13) ˙ X(t)
X(t)



















land has been normalized to unity, i.e. K(t)=K=1. Throughout the paper we analyze the case in
which initially both the government debt and the stock of foreign assets are zero, i.e. B=F=0
initially. This ensures that initial financial wealth is strictly positive, i.e. A=V>0 initially. Equation
(T1.2) shows that this is consistent with a steady state provided the world interest rate exceeds the
-6-rate of time preference, i.e. r=rF>a initially. The rising full consumption profile that this implies
ensures that financial wealth is transferred from old to young generations in the steady-state (see
Blanchard, 1985).
2.2. Firms
The economy consists of a single sector characterized by monopolistic competition. Each firm in
this sector faces a demand for its product, Y i
D(t), from two sources: the consumption demand from
the households sector (represented by CD,i(t) which is obtained by aggregating the first expression
in (2.12)), and the demand from the rest of the world (given by CF
*
,i(t) in equation (2.20) below).
There are N(t) identical domestic firms that each produce one variety of the differentiated product.
The typical firm’s decision on how much inputs to use is based on profit maximisation. There are
increasing returns to scale at the firm level and the gross production function is homogeneous of
degree l (³1) in the two production factors land (Ki(t)) and labour (Li(t)):
where Yi(t) is marketable output, 0<eL<1, and f is fixed cost (f>0) expressed in terms of the firm’s
(2.14) Yi(t) f º F(Ki(t),Li(t)) Li(t)
leLKi(t)
l(1 eL),
own output. Representative firm i’s profit is defined by:
where W(t)PD(t) is the nominal wage rate, RL(t)PD(t) is the nominal rental rate on land, and sP is
(2.15) Pi(t) º 1 sP PD,i(t)Y
D
i (t) W(t)PD(t)Li(t) RL(t)PD(t)Ki(t),
an ad valorem subsidy on production.
7 The firm chooses its output and price in order to maximize
(2.15) subject to the demand restriction Yi(t)=Y i
D(t)=CD,i(t)+CF
*
,i(t) and the production function
(2.14). This essentially static decision problem yields the familiar marginal conditions for labour
and land:












demand curve faced by firm i. In this paper the assumption of Chamberlinian monopolistic
competition is made: competitors’ reactions are deemed to be absent and entry/exit is assumed to
occur until each active firm makes zero excess profit; the well-known tangency solution. In terms
of the present model this implies that N(t) changes instantaneously such that existing firms make
no excess-profits. This in turn implies that the markup equals the scale parameter divided by
average productivity, i.e. µi(t)=l(Yi(t)+f)/Yi(t).
-7-2.3. The government
The government sector is modelled in a very simple fashion. We abstract from macro features of
government behaviour such as government spending on goods and services, and distortionary taxes
on labour income. The periodic budget identity of the government is:
where T(t) is the real lump-sum tax levied on the households and Y(t) is a quantity index for
(2.17) ˙ B(t) r(t)B(t) sPY(t) tM(t)E(t)CF(t) T(t),
national income:










































The resulting expression is given (for period t) in equation (T1.5) in Table 1.
2.4. The foreign sector
The domestic economy has links with the rest of the world through the goods market (via imports
and exports of differentiated products) and through the assets market (domestic households can
hold foreign assets in their portfolios). Since it is assumed that the domestic economy is small
relative to the rest of the world, domestic variables have no impact on foreign macroeconomic
variables. Hence, the export equation contains mainly exogenous variables. For simplicity the
following specification is adopted for the export demand equation:
where CF
















how well domestically produced varieties can be substituted by the buyers in the rest of the world.
There is also a separate effect of the real exchange rate on aggregate exports which is
parameterised by sT. Note that equation (2.20) can be seen as the rest of the world’s equivalent to
the second expression in equation (2.12) (in aggregate form).
8 In view of the aggregate version of
-8-the first expression in (2.12) and (2.20) it is clear that ei(t)=sC so that the common markup of
domestic firms is constant and equal to µ=µi(t)=sC/(sC-1)>1.
The change in net foreign assets is equal to the current account. Since net foreign assets,
F(t), are measured in terms of foreign goods, the balance of payments equation can be expressed
(for period t) as in equation (T1.4) in Table 1. The first term on the right-hand side is foreign
capital income, whilst the second term is real export earnings in terms of the foreign composite
good.
2.5. Equilibrium and stability
The value of the fixed stock of land can be deduced by appealing to the arbitrage equation
between the different tangible assets. The total stock of land is fixed (at K=1) and the market price
of land in terms of the domestic composite good is denoted by V(t). Land attracts the market rate
of return:





competitive sector, RL(t), all expressed in terms of the initial price of the land. By solving (2.21)
forward (subject to a transversality condition), the real market price of land can be expressed as the
appropriately discounted value of the stream of rental income:
As is conventional in the macroeconomic literature on imperfect competition, attention is


















restricted to the symmetric equilibrium in which all firms behave in an identical fashion, i.e.
PD,i(t)=P ¯(t), CD,i(t)=C ¯




*(t) for all domestic
firms (i=1,2,..,N(t)), and PF,j(t)=P ¯
F, and CF,j(t)=C ¯
F(t) for all foreign firms (j=1,2,...,N
*). Since the
price and number of foreign varieties of the differentiated good are both fixed, a suitable
normalisation ensures that the price index PF(t) equals unity. Under symmetry the model can be
rewritten in aggregate terms.
The complete dynamic model is given in aggregated form in Table 1. The dynamic part of
the model is given by equations (T1.1)-(T1.5). The value of one unit of land evolves according to
(T1.1), which is obtained by rewriting (2.21). The movement of full consumption (T1.2), the
uncovered interest parity condition (T1.3), the balance of payments equation (T1.4), and the
-9-government solvency condition (T1.5) have all been discussed above.
The static part of the model is given by equations (T1.6)-(T1.10). The aggregate demand
for labour depends positively on the output index (given in (2.18)), and negatively on the real
wage rate. The expression for the rental rate on land is given in (T1.7). Land owners receive the
output left over after the factor labour has been paid. The equilibrium condition for the domestic
market for differentiated goods is written in aggregate form in (T1.8). The private demands for the
composite domestic and foreign good and labour supply are given in (T1.9). Finally, the aggregate
production function for the differentiated goods sector is given in (T1.10). It is the aggregated
version of (2.14), where use has been made of the zero pure profit condition.
9
The model is given in log-linearized form in Table 2. A tilde ( ~') above a variable
denotes its rate of change around the initial steady-state, e.g., X ˜(t)ºdX(t)/X. A variable with a tilde
and a dot is the time derivative expressed in terms of the initial steady-state, for example,
X ˜
.
(t)ºX ˙(t)/X. The only exceptions to that convention refer to the tariff, the various financial assets,
and lump-sum taxes: t ˜M(t)ºdtM(t)/(1+tM), V ˜(t)ºrFdV(t)/Y, V ˜
.
(t)ºrFV ˙(t)/Y, B ˜(t)ºrFdB(t)/Y, B ˜
.
(t)
ºrFB ˙(t)/Y, F ˜(t)ºrFdF(t)/Y, F ˜
.
(t)ºrFF ˙(t)/Y, and T ˜(t)ºdT(t)/Y.
The model can be reduced to a three-dimensional system of first-order differential
equations in net foreign assets, F ˜(t), the value of land, V ˜(t), and full consumption, X ˜(t). Of these
state variables, the net foreign asset position is predetermined, whilst the value of land and full
consumption are non-predetermined jump' variables. Conditional upon the state variables, the
static part of the log-linearized model, consisting of equations (T2.6)-(T2.10) in Table 2, can be
used to derive the following quasi-reduced form' expressions:
(2.23) ˜ Y(t) heL˜ L(t) ˜ W(t) ˜ L(t) ˜ RL(t) (f 1) ˜ X(t),
(2.24) sTwX ˜ E(t) (f wX) ˜ X(t),
where wXºECF/Y=CF
*E
sT/Y=(1-gD)/(1+gDtM) is the initial share of international trade (viz. imports
(2.25) sTwX ˜ CF(t) ˜ tM(t) f (sT 1)wX ˜ X(t),
equals exports) in aggregate output. The composite parameter f represents the strength of the
labour supply effect (due to intertemporal substitution) on aggregate domestic output. It is defined
as follows:





intertemporal substitution elasticity of labour supply. Note that f=1 if labour supply is exogenous
(since L=1 implies that wLL=0). Since wLL³0, f³1 is implied if heL£1. If heL<1, f is a concave
function of wLL with a positive asymptote of (1-heL)
-1 as wLL®¥, and if heL=1, f=1+wLL.I fheL>1,
on the other hand, f has a vertical asymptote at wLL=(heL-1)
-1, and for 0<wLL<( heL-1)
-1, f is a
convex and increasing function of wLL exceeding unity. In order to cover this remaining case, and
thus to ensure that f³1, we make the following convenient assumption regarding the range of
admissible values for the intertemporal substitution elasticity of labour supply.
ASSUMPTION 1: If heL>1 it is assumed that 0£wLL<(heL-1)
-1.
Equation (2.24) shows that, since f³1 and 0<wX<1, full consumption exerts a negative effect on
the real exchange rate. The intuition behind this effect can be explained with the aid of Figure 1,
which depicts the situation on the domestic goods market, conditional upon the level of full
consumption. The real exchange rate is determined by the domestic goods market clearing
condition (T1.8). Aggregate supply depends negatively on full consumption, via the labour supply
effect, but does not depend on the real exchange rate.
10 Hence, the aggregate supply curve is
represented by the vertical line Y






sT and depends positively on the real exchange rate due to the effect on real export
spending; see Y
D(E,X0) in Figure 1. The equilibrium real exchange rate, E0, is given by the
intersection of aggregate supply and demand at point e0.
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Now consider what happens if full consumption falls, say from X0 to X1. Since full
consumption is a normal good, the demand for domestic goods falls and the aggregate demand
curve shifts to the left. At the same time, labour supply is increased, so that the aggregate supply
curve shifts to the right. For the initial real exchange rate, there is an excess supply of goods,
which causes the domestic price to fall and thus the real exchange rate to rise. Equilibrium is
restored in point e1, where both output and the real exchange rate are higher. Consequently, a
reduction in full consumption results in an increase of the real exchange rate.
Equation (T2.3) in combination with the time derivative of (2.24) yields an expression for
the change in the domestic interest rate (satisfying the uncovered interest parity condition) which
can be substituted in (T2.1) and (T2.2). By also substituting (2.24)-(2.25) and the second
expression in (T2.9) into (T2.4) and simplifying, the dynamical system for the economy is
-11-obtained:






























































(rF a)(1 z) rF (rF a)(1 z) wK rF(f 1) (rF a)(1 z)
(rF a)z/wK (rF a)z/wK (rF a)z
,
(2.27), G(t), is defined as:


































(rF a) ˜ B(t).
and r2
*>0) and one negative (stable) root (-h
*<0). Since the product of the characteristic roots equals
the determinant of D, stability thus requires that D be negative. After some elementary
operations we find that this is indeed the case:
where the feasible range for the initial product subsidy is such that the share of land owners in
(2.30) D º h r1 r2 r
2
F f(z/wK)(rF a)(1 wK)<0 ,
aggregate income lies strictly between zero and unity, i.e. -1<sP<eL/(1-eL) ensures that 0<wK<1.
Proposition 1 summarizes some results that can be derived for the model.
PROPOSITION 1: Let -1<sP<eL/(1-eL). The loglinearized model of Table 2 implies the following




*<0. (iii) The second unstable root satisfies r2
*>2rF-a. PROOF: See
Bettendorf and Heijdra (1998).
-12-3. The macroeconomic effects of an import tariff
In this section we study the allocation effects of an unanticipated and permanent increase of the
import tariff. The time at which the policy shock occurs is normalized to zero (hence, t ˜M(t)=t ˜M >0
for t³0). We assume that no debt policy is used and that the tariff revenue is rebated in a lump-
sum fashion to households. Since both public debt and net foreign assets are zero in the initial
situation (B=F=0), the trade balance is in equilibrium and the only durable asset that is used by
agents to transfer resources intertemporally in the initial steady state consists of claims to domestic
land.
In order to explain the intuition behind the results, we use the diagrammatic apparatus of
Figure 2, in which the exact long-run model solution plus the approximate transitional dynamics
are studied. The first equation in (2.27) explains the time path of net foreign assets and can be
written as follows:
where f is given in (2.26). In the steady state, F ˜
.




(t) rF ˜ F(t) f ˜ X(t) wX˜ tM ,
equilibrium locus, which has been drawn as the CA schedule in Figure 2. This schedule is upward
sloping because, as net foreign assets rise the country receives more interest income from the rest
of the world. In order to restore current account equilibrium domestic households must spend more
on foreign goods. This is established via a rise in full consumption.
The second and third equations of (2.27) show that the dynamic paths for full consumption
and the value of domestic land depend on all three state variables. A full graphical analysis of the
transition path would thus necessitate a three-dimensional graph. To explain the basic intuition we
reduce this dimensionality by basing the graphical analysis (but not the analytical results) on the
assumption that adjustment in land values occurs fully at impact, i.e. V ˜(t)=V ˜(¥) for t³0. The
steady-state version of equation of (2.27) furnishes the expression for the steady-state effect of the
tariff on the value of domestic land:





decreases in the long-run. By substituting V ˜(t)=V ˜(¥) into the third equation in (2.27) the following
expression for the modified Euler equation is obtained:
-13-In the steady-state, X ˜
.




(t) (rF a)(z/wK) wK ˜ X(t) ˜ F(t) ˜ V(¥).
drawn as the MKR schedule in Figure 2.
12 This schedule is upward sloping because, in the long
run, the domestic rate of interest is equal to the exogenous world rate. This implies, by (2.13), that
the long-run ratio of financial assets to full consumption, A(¥)/X(¥), is constant also. Hence,
ceteris paribus the value of land, an increase in net foreign assets must be accompanied by an
increase in full consumption.
3.1. Long-run effects
Since an increase in the tariff decreases the long-run value of land (see (3.2)) the MKR locus shifts
down as agents are poorer. The CA curve shifts to the left because ceteris paribus, an increase in
the tariff reduces imports and thus creates a trade balance surplus. In terms of Figure 2, the old
equilibrium e0 lies below the new CA line. In the long run, the economy settles in the new
equilibrium e1 which features a positive net foreign asset position, i.e. a net claim on the rest of the
world, and a higher level of full consumption:








by using (3.4) and (2.23):
which shows that the effects are strictly negative if labour supply is endogenous (f>1). Since there




is no long-run effect on the domestic interest rate due to the perfect mobility of financial capital
(r ˜(¥)=0), the long-run effect on the rental price of land is proportional to the effect on land values
(given in (3.2)).
The long-run effect on the wage rate is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the
relative strength of the diversity effect h. Indeed, by using (2.23) and (3.4) we obtain:
With exogenous labour supply (f=1) or a sufficiently strong diversity effect (heL=1), wages are
(3.6) ˜ W(¥)
(heL 1)(f 1)wX˜ tM
fheL(1 wK)
.
unaffected by the tariff. In the first case, the labour supply curve is vertical and does not shift,
-14-whereas in the second case the labour demand curve is horizontal as the marginal productivity of
labour is constant. If the diversity effect is stronger (h>1/eL) the demand for labour is upward
sloping, and if labour supply is endogenous (f>1), the real wage falls as a result of the tariff.
Under perfect competition the diversity effect is absent (h=1) and the real wage must rise in the
long run.
13
The long-run effect on the real exchange rate can be computed by using (2.24) and (3.4):





supply is fixed. Since full consumption rises, however, the aggregate demand curve is shifted to
the right as the demand for home goods by domestic agents increases. As a result, equilibrium is
restored with an unchanged output level and a lower (appreciated) real exchange rate. In terms of
Figure 3, the equilibrium shifts from e0 to e1. If labour supply is endogenous (f>1), the increase in
the tariff shifts the aggregate supply curve from Y
S(X0)t oY
S(X1) and the net result of the tariff
increase is a move from e0 to e2, where both output and the real exchange rate are lower.
3.2. Short-run and transition effects
In the impact period, the two unstable jump' variables full consumption and the value of land
ensure that the economy settles onto the stable plane leading the economy towards the new steady-
state equilibrium described above. It is shown in Bettendorf and Heijdra (1998) that the jumps can
be written as follows:

















wX˜ tM <( wX/f)˜ tM,

















for full consumption, whereas the opposite holds for the value of land, i.e. X ˜(0)<X ˜(¥) and
V ˜(0)>V ˜(¥). Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that V ˜(0)<wKX ˜(0), a result which will prove
useful in the welfare evaluation in section 4.1 below.
Both jumps consist of a pure efficiency effect (the first term in square brackets in (3.8) and
(3.9), respectively) and a distributional effect (second term).
14 Equation (3.8) shows that the sign
-15-of the full consumption jump is theoretically ambiguous because the efficiency and distributional
effects work in opposite directions. There are strong presumptions, however, that the first effect
dominates and X ˜(0) is positive for all but extremely pathological cases. A number of non-
pathological special cases can be shown in support of this claim. First, if labour supply is
exogenous (f=1), then the term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (3.8) is positive,
because 0<z<1 and r2
*>rF-a (see Proposition 1(iii)). The same conclusion holds if f is not too
large', which is the case if the diversity effect is not too strong'. Second, if sT=1 then 0<zf=wX<0
so that r2
*>(rF-a)zf regardless of the magnitude of the labour supply parameter f. Again, the same
conclusion holds for values of sT that are not too large. It can be demonstrated numerically that
X ˜(0)<0 if the diversity effect is extremely strong and the export elasticity is much larger than
unity. In order to avoid having to deal with this theoretical curiosum, we make the following
assumption regarding the product fz:
ASSUMPTION 2: If f,sT>1 it is assumed that the efficiency effect of a tariff dominates the
distributional effect in full consumption, i.e. the parameters are such that r2
*>(rF-a)zf.
In a similar fashion, the impact jump in the value of land is ambiguous because the efficiency
effect is non-positive and the distributional effect is positive, so that the net effect depends on the
magnitude of the labour supply parameter f. If labour supply is exogenous (f=1), then output does
not change as a result of the tariff shock, the efficiency effect is zero, and the value of land
increases at impact due to the distributional effect. On the other hand, if labour supply is
sufficiently elastic (f>2), then land values fall at impact because the efficiency effect dominates the
distributional effect (see Bettendorf and Heijdra (1998)). Since f>2 does not represent a
particularly outlandish scenario, we conclude that the impact effect on the value of land is
inherently ambiguous for realistic values of the parameters.
Further intuition regarding the exact impact results of (3.8)-(3.9) can be obtained by
appealing to the approximate transition dynamics illustrated in Figure 2, which is based on the
assumption that the impact and long-run effects on the value of land are equal to each other (see
above).
15 With that approximation, the phase diagram can be constructed as in Figure 2. From
(3.3) it is clear that points above (below) the MKR curve are associated with a rising (falling) full
consumption profile. Similarly, (3.1) shows that points to the right (left) of the CA line are
associated with a current account surplus (deficit) and consequently with an increase (decrease) in
net foreign assets. The approximate saddle path lies between the CA and MKR lines, and is
upward sloping. At impact, the economy jumps from e0 to e¢, at which point a current account
-16-surplus is opened up. During adjustment, net foreign assets and full consumption gradually increase
toward their respective long-run equilibrium levels associated with point e1.
The impact effects on output, employment, and factor prices are obtained by using (2.23)
and (3.8):
With endogenous labour supply (f>1), both output and employment fall at impact as a result of the
(3.10) ˜ Y(0) heL˜ L(0) ˜ RL(0) 1 1/(heL)
1 ˜ W(0) (f 1) ˜ X(0) £ 0.
increase in the tariff. The decrease in employment results in a reduction in the marginal product of
land which explains the fall in the rental price of land. The impact effect on the wage rate is
ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of the diversity effect, as was explained above for
the long run. Irrespective of market configuration, however, with endogenous labour supply (f>1)
the wage-rental ratio unambiguously rises, i.e. the adverse effect on factor payments is worse for
landlords than for labourers. Indeed, by using (3.10) we obtain:
The incidence of the import tariff on factor prices is thus largest for the production factor that is











˜ X(0) > 0.
most elastic in supply which, in the present model, is the factor land.
The impact effect on the real exchange rate is computed by using (2.24) and (3.8):
In Figure 3, the impact effect on output and the real exchange rate is represented by the move
(3.12) sTwX ˜ E(0) (f wX) ˜ X(0) < 0.
from the initial equilibrium at e0 to point e¢. Ceteris paribus, the impact appreciation of the real
exchange rate reduces exports and stimulates imports. Furthermore, the increase in full
consumption boosts imports whilst the increase in the tariff reduces imports. Bettendorf and
Heijdra (1998) show that the net impact effect on imports is negative. Since exports fall by less
than imports, the effect on net exports is unambiguously positive. Indeed, by using (2.25) and
(3.12) in (3.1) we obtain the following expression:






(0) wX (sT 1) ˜ E(0) ˜ CF(0) f ˜ X(0) wX˜ tM >0 ,
period (F ˜(0)=0), as well as the upper bound for X ˜(0) in (3.8).
A similar type of reasoning can be used to show that the impact effect on the domestic real
interest rate is negative. Indeed, by using (T2.3) and the time derivative of (2.24), the following
-17-expression is obtained:
















the right-hand side of (3.14) is negative, so that the impact effect on the real interest rate is
negative.
The exact expressions of the transition paths for net foreign assets, the value of land, and
full consumption are:
where h
* represents the adjustment speed in the economy. Since X ˜(0)<X ˜(¥), full consumption
(3.15) ˜ F(t) 1 e
h t ˜ F(¥),
(3.16) ˜ V(t) e
h t ˜ V(0) 1 e
h t ˜ V(¥),
(3.17) ˜ X(t) e
h t ˜ X(0) 1 e
h t ˜ X(¥),
gradually increases towards its new steady-state value. Furthermore, since V ˜(0)>V ˜(¥), the value of
land gradually falls to its new equilibrium level. Since output, employment, the rental rate, the
wage rate, imports, and the real exchange rate can all be expressed in terms of full consumption
(see equations (2.23)-(2.25)), the transition paths for these variables all have the same form as the
one for full consumption, i.e. they can all be written as a weighted average of the initial and long-
run response. For the domestic interest rate, however, there is no long-run effect, due to interest
parity, and the adjustment path is written as:
Following its fall at impact, the real interest rate gradually increases towards its long-run
(3.18)




equilibrium value rF. This of course implies that the real exchange rate decreases during transition.
4. Intergenerational welfare analysis
In order to evaluate the welfare effects during transition, we must take into account that different
generations are affected differently by a change of the import tariff, as this changes the rental rate
and hence the market value of land, which is owned by the elder generations. So welfare effects
-18-contain both efficiency aspects and generational distribution aspects. In order to link the allocation
effects of the previous section to the welfare effects in this section, the cost-of-living index, PU(t),
is used to relate sub-utility to full consumption:





where W1 is a positive constant. Equation (4.2) shows that increases in the real wage, the real




exchange rate, or the tariff all lead to an increase in the cost-of-living index. In view of (4.1) a
change in sub-utility can thus be decomposed into a term due to a change in full consumption and
a change in the cost-of-living index. This decomposition is useful to explain the intuition behind
the welfare effect on different generations.
4.1. Intergenerational welfare effects without bond policy
To bring out the main issues clearly, we first study the case where no debt policy is used, i.e.
B ˜(t)=0 "t³0. The welfare effect on generations that exist at the time of the shock (t=0) is denoted
by dL(v,0), with v£0. It is shown in Bettendorf and Heijdra (1998) that this effect can be written
as follows:
where X ˜(v,0)ºdX(v,0)/X(v,0) is the jump at impact in the level of full consumption by a household
(4.3) (a b)dL(v,0) ˜ X(v,0) rF {˜ r,a b} (a b) { ˜ PU,a b}, v£0,
of generation v, and {r ˜,a+b} and {P ˜
U,a+b} represent the Laplace transforms of the paths of r ˜(t)
and P ˜
U(t)ºdPU(t)/PU, respectively, with a+b acting as the discount factor (see below).
16 The full-
consumption effect, X ˜(v,0), can be re-written as follows:
where wH is the initial economy-wide share of human wealth in total wealth (0<wH<1) and V ˜(0) is
(4.4) ˜ X(v,0) ˜ V(0)/wK (1/wH)e
(rF a)v ˜ X(0) ˜ V(0)/wK , v£0,
the change in the value of land that occurs as a result of the change of the import tariff (see (3.9)).
Equation (4.4) implies that the full-consumption jump is increasing in the generations index v, i.e.
¶X ˜(v,0)/¶v>0.
17 The intuition behind this result is as follows. The increase in the import tariff
-19-gives rise to additional lump-sum transfers. Since all generations have the same expected remaining
lifetime the present value of these additional transfers is the same for all generations. This implies
that all existing generations enjoy the same effect on human wealth and thus, on that account,
increase their full consumption by the same absolute amount. Since old generations are, however,
much wealthier than young generations, this human wealth effect is much more important to the
latter generations.
The second and third terms on the right-hand side of (4.5) affect all existing generations
equally. The second term represents the growth in full consumption. Since all generations are on
an Euler equation of the form (2.10), the path of the interest rate affects all existing generations in
the same way. Finally, the third term represents the cost-of-living effect which simply links full
consumption to sub-utility (see (4.1) above).
In view of equation (4.3)-(4.4), dL(v,0) can be written as a weighted average of the effect
on an extremely old generation, dL(-¥,0), and the effect on a newborn, dL(0,0):
Furthermore, in view of the fact that ¶X ˜(v,0)/¶v>0, equation (4.5) implies that dL(-¥,0)< dL(0,0)
(4.5) dL(v,0) 1 e
(rF a)v dL( ¥,0) e
(rF a)vdL(0,0), v£0.
as the welfare effect on existing generations is monotonically decreasing in age, i.e. ¶dL(v,0)/¶v>0.
Whilst it is thus straightforward to give a relative ranking of the effects on the different
generations, it is not possible to determine analytically the absolute effects on the generations. The
reason for this ambiguity can be clarified by studying the component parts that make up the total
welfare effect. A close inspection of (4.4) reveals that the sign of the full consumption jump,
X ˜(v,0), is ambiguous in general. On the one hand, if labour supply is exogenous (f=1), then V ˜(0)>0
(see (3.9)) and X ˜(v,0)>0 for all v, but on the other hand for higher values of f, V ˜(0) will be
negative and hence X ˜(v,0)<0 for some generations v. In the latter case the effect on the level of full
consumption of extremely old generations is negative due to the capital loss they suffer on land.
Since aggregate full-consumption increases at impact (see (3.8) and note Assumption 2), this
implies that the effect on newborns’ full consumption must be positive.
The growth term for full consumption is unambiguously negative. It was shown in the
previous section that the domestic interest rate falls at impact after which it returns to its initial
level during transition (see (3.18)). This implies that the Laplace transform for the path of the
interest rate has the following form:
(4.6) {˜ r,a b} º ˜ r(0)
a b h
<0 .
-20-The cost-of-living term can be written as a weighted average of the initial and long-run
effect on the cost-of-living index:
The ambiguity of the sign of the cost-of-living term is obvious in view of the fact that the impact
(4.7) { ˜ PU,a b} º






and long-run effects on both the wage and the tariff-inclusive real exchange rate are ambiguous.
Only for some special cases more can be said about the components of {P ˜
U,a+b}. For example,
if labour supply is exogenous (f=1) or the diversity effect is sufficiently strong (heL>1) it can be
demonstrated that the cost-of-living index falls over time, i.e. P ˜
U(¥)>P ˜
U(0) in that case.
The results in (4.4)-(4.7) thus show that the welfare effect on existing generations is
difficult to sign unambiguously due to the fact that the different components are themselves
ambiguous or work in different directions from each other. It is possible, however, to determine a
relative ranking of the welfare effects on present and future generations. Future generations are
born in a world that is different from the initial steady state as a result of the shock. The change in
welfare that future generations experience is evaluated at birth, i.e. the relevant indicator is dL(t,t)
for v=t³0. It is shown in Bettendorf and Heijdra (1998) that this welfare indicator can be written as
a weighted average of the effect on a newborn, dL(0,0), and the effect on a generation born in the
new steady state, dL(¥,¥):
where dL(0,0) is obtained from (4.3)-(4.4) by setting v=0, and dL(¥,¥) is given by:
(4.8) dL(t,t) e
h tdL(0,0) 1 e
h t dL(¥,¥), t v³0,
It is shown in Bettendorf and Heijdra (1998) that the generations born in the new steady-state are
(4.9) (a b)dL(¥,¥) ˜ X(¥) ˜ PU(¥).
better off than very old generations, i.e. dL(-¥,0)<dL(¥,¥). The reason is that these generations
experience a higher full consumption level (X ˜(¥)>X ˜(0)) which is not offset by cost-of-living
changes. Numerical simulations strongly suggest that dL(0,0)<dL(¥,¥) although we have been
unable to prove this result unambiguously.
18
The main characteristics of the path of (the change of) utility have been summarised in
Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2. The solution paths for utility given in (4.5) and (4.8) satisfy the following
properties: (i) The change in welfare of an existing generation depends negatively on its year of
-21-birth v, i.e., dL(-¥,0)<dL(0,0); (ii) Old existing generations gain less than future steady-state
generations, i.e., dL(-¥,0)<dL(¥,¥). PROOF: See Bettendorf and Heijdra (1998).
4.2. Some numerical illustrations
As was shown in section 3 above, the macroeconomic effects of an import tariff consist of a
gradual accumulation of foreign assets, and a gradual increase in full consumption. However, it is
not in general possible to determine the sign of the welfare effects on current and future
generations. For that reason, we further illustrate Proposition 2 with the aid of some numerical
simulations with a plausibly calibrated version of the model.
Since we wish to study the effects on the intergenerational distribution of the initial tariff
(tM), the strength of the preference for diversity effect (as summarized by h), the export elasticity
(sT), the degree of openness' of the economy (as summarized by 1-gD), and the pre-existing
product subsidy (sP), the model is calibrated in such a way that these parameters can be freely
varied. The parameters that are held fixed throughout the simulations are the rate of pure time
preference (a=0.02), the birth rate (b=0.06), and the efficiency parameter of labour (eL=0.7). The
world interest rate (rF) and the productivity index (W0) are used as calibration parameters. For
given values of tM, h, sT, gD, and sP, it is then possible to compute all relevant remaining
information.
19
Table 3 presents a number of welfare indicators for different values of tM in the different
rows. Panel (a) of Table 3 is devoted to investigating the effect of the diversity parameter h on the
distribution of welfare, whilst panels (b) through (e) do the same for sT, gD, and sP, respectively.
Consider panel (a) for tM=0 initially. The intergenerational distribution of welfare is very uneven.
Very old existing agents lose substantially (dL(-¥,0)<0) but newborns at the time of the shock as
well as all future generation gains unambiguously (dL(0,0)>0 and dL(¥,¥)>0, so that (4.8) shows
that dL(t,t)>0 for all t³0). This pattern is preserved for all values of h considered provided the pre-
existing tariff is not too high (tM£0.3, see the first three rows of Table 3, panel (a)).
Hence, the simulations demonstrate that, for a wide range of values of h and tM, very old
generations lose whereas young generations gain as a result of an increase in the tariff. But how
does the change in the import tariff affect the population alive at the time of the shock? In order to
answer that question we compute s(%), which represents the percentage of the population (alive at
the time of the shock) which is no worse-off as a result of the tariff shock. In view of equation
(4.5), s(%) can be written as:
This variable can be interpreted as the degree of political support that exists for the introduction of
a tariff (if tM=0 initially), or for a marginal increase of the tariff (if tM>0 initially). Indeed, if s(%)
-22-exceeds fifty percent one would expect the existing population to vote in favour of introducing (or



















increasing) the tariff. The information in panel (a) of Table 3 suggests that the degree of political
support decreases with the diversity parameter h. For example, if tM=0 initially, political support is
above fifty percent for h£1.2 but is below fifty percent for larger values of h. This shows that,
provided the diversity effect is sufficiently strong, the uneven intergenerational burden can make
the introduction of a tariff unattractive to existing generations.
The second conclusion that can be drawn from panel (a) of Table 3 concerns the effect of
a pre-existing tariff. Raising the initial value of tM drags down the welfare profile for most present
generations and all future generations. As a result, political support declines as the pre-existing
tariff is raised. For example, if tM=0.1 and h=1.0, there is not enough political support for a further
increase in the tariff. Even though the young continue to gain from such a further increase, too
many older generations lose out in this case.
In panel (b) of Table 3 the effect of the export elasticity on the intergenerational welfare
distribution is studied. Three main conclusions emerge from these simulation results. First, raising
sT decreases the gains to all generations. The intuition behind this result is that a higher value for
sT reduces the terms of trade gains. The second conclusion that can be drawn is that for low values
of sT there exists quite substantial political support for a high tariff. For example, if sT=1 (first
column), even if tM=0.9 initially, there is still a majority among existing generations in favour of a
higher tariff. In that case the country as a whole has a lot of market power (in the sense of Gros
(1987)), and can therefore obtain a substantial appreciation of its real exchange rate at the expense
of foreigners. The third conclusion is that, like in the previous case, political support declines with
the pre-existing tariff.
In panel (c) of Table 3, the effect of the degree of openness of the economy is investigated
numerically. Two major conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, reducing the trade
share (raising gD) reduces the welfare loss for extremely old generations, and reduces the welfare
gain by generations born in the new steady-state. The effect on newly-born generations is
ambiguous. If tM is low initially, these generations’ gains are reduced as gD rises, whereas the
opposite conclusion holds if tM is high. Political support increases with gD. The intuition behind this
result is that a relatively closed economy has a smaller scope to obtain a welfare transfer from the
rest of the world by means of terms of trade gains that are caused by the tariff. The second
conclusion that can be drawn is that, as in the previous two cases, raising the initial tariff reduces
-23-political support.
In panel (d) of Table 3 the effect of the pre-existing product subsidy sP is investigated. The
main conclusions is that an increase in sP leads to an upward shift of the welfare change for all
generations, i.e. it reduces the welfare losses to old generations, and increases the gains to both
newborns and all future generations. The reason is that the product subsidy helps to boost
employment and output and thus leads to a reduction in the severity of the domestic distortion due
to monopolistic competition (see Bettendorf and Heijdra (1996)). This suggests that there exists a
complementarity between the instruments of trade policy (tM) and industrial policy (sP).
4.3. Intergenerational redistribution policy
In the previous section it has been demonstrated that the welfare effect of a supposedly
efficiency-improving' policy measure is generation-dependent, and may be negative for most or
all present generations. This finding demonstrates the need for a mechanism that provides for a
more even distribution of welfare over generations. Indeed, since most or all gainers' are yet-
unborn and all losers' are alive at the time of the shock, the political system of majority rule
would seem to have an inherent bias against a tariff. The present generations in effect produce an
intergenerational externality by not supporting the introduction of (or further increase in) the tariff.
Generations born in the new steady state are better off both because there are terms of trade gains
and because they enjoy a net claim on the rest of the world.
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In this section we endow the policy maker with the ability to use bond policy in order to
neutralize the intergenerational welfare effects. In doing so the pure efficiency effects' of the
import tariff are brought to the fore. Obviously, since old existing generations lose and future
generations gain in the absence of bond policy, the natural choice is to accumulate public debt by
granting a once-off subsidy to the owners of land at the time of the shock. Since land holdings are
predetermined in the impact period, the proper scheme links the once-off subsidy (sK) to the value
of land, i.e. a member of generation v (<0) receives a subsidy of sKV(0)K(v,0), the aggregate
outlays on the subsidy is sKV(0), and the discrete change in the government’s debt position at
impact is given in log-linearized form by B ˜(0)=-sKV ˜(0). It is shown in Bettendorf and Heijdra
(1998) that, provided the subsidy is set at the appropriate level, no further debt policy is needed to
ensure that the welfare of all generations is affected equally, i.e. B ˜(t)=B ˜(0) for t³0. The
appropriately conducted bond policy ensures that B ˜(0)=wXwKt ˜M, which in turn eliminates all
transitional dynamics from the model.
The allocation effects of the change in the tariff accompanied by the bond policy can be
computed by substituting B ˜(t)=wXwKt ˜M into (2.29) and solving for the (impact, transition, and long-
-24-run) effects on the state variables:
for all t³0. The expression for full consumption can be combined with (2.23)-(2.25) to obtain the
(4.11) ˜ F(t) 0, ˜ V(t) wXwK (f 1)/f ˜ tM <0 , ˜ X(t) (wX/f)˜ tM >0 ,
effects on the other endogenous variables:
for all t³0.
(4.12)
˜ Y(t) heL ˜ L(t) ˜ RL(t) 1 1/(heL)
1 ˜ W(t) wX (f 1)/f ˜ tM <0 , ˜ r(t) 0,
sTf ˜ E(t) (f wX)˜ tM <0 , fsT ˜ CF(t) (f wX)(sT 1)˜ tM <0 ,
The intuition behind these results can be explained with the aid of Figure 2. As before, the
increase in the tariff shifts the CA and MKR loci from CA0 to CA1 and from MKR0 to MKR1,
respectively. The upward jump in the public debt (B ˜(0)=wXwKt ˜M>0) does not affect the CA locus
but the MKR locus is shifted to the left, i.e. from MKR1 to MKR2. Due to the once-off subsidy to
landowners the increase in the tariff does not only leave the domestic interest rate unaffected (see
(4.12)) but also raises full consumption by the same relative amount for all generations (see
(2.13)). This neutralizes the differential welfare effect on all existing generations, i.e. dL(v,0)=p for
all v£0, where p is the common welfare gain.
Since the policy also eliminates any transitional dynamics from the economy, all future
generations are affected in exactly the same manner, i.e. dL(v,v)=p for all v=t³0. The level of the
common gain to all generations under this egalitarian policy can thus be computed by using (4.9),
(4.11)-(4.12), and the log-linearized version of (4.2):
where G(tM,sP) is a complicated function of the parameters and the pre-existing tariff and product
(4.13) p G(tM,sP)˜ tM,
subsidy. In order to build up intuition concerning this function, it is useful to consider some special
cases. First, if labour supply is exogenous (f=g=1), output is fixed and independent of the product
subsidy, and sP drops out of G(tM,sP) altogether:
This expression immediately suggests that introducing a tariff is beneficial (as G(0,sP)>0) and that
(4.14) G(tM,sP) º
(1 gD)gD 1 tM(sT 1)
sT(1 gDtM)
,f o r f 1.
the first-best optimal tariff (for which G(tM
F,sP)=0) is aimed at fully exploiting the national market
power' resulting from the upward sloping export function, i.e. tM
F=1/(sT-1).
If labour supply is endogenous (f>1), matters are much more complicated. Bettendorf and
-25-Heijdra (1996) show that an increase in the product subsidy (under an egalitarian bond policy)
boosts full consumption, output, employment, the number of product varieties, wages, and the
rental on land, and induces a depreciation of the real exchange rate. The consequence of this is that
the pre-existing product subsidy affects G(tM,sP) directly, so that the issue of the optimal tariff is
complicated by second-best considerations, because sP may be sub-optimal itself. In order to get a
handle on this problem, we compute the second-best optimal egalitarian product subsidy which
takes into account the existence of pre-existing tariffs. In Bettendorf and Heijdra (1998) we derive
the following expression for sP
S(tM):
If there is no pre-existing tariff (tM=0), sP


















Heijdra (1996), and part of the benefits of the product subsidy leak away to the rest of the world in
the form of a real exchange rate depreciation. Interestingly, equation (4.15) suggests that ¶sP
S/¶tM>0,
which suggests that the industrial policy stance can be more ambitious, the higher is the initial
tariff.
Of course, sP
S in (4.15) is itself second-best since it still depends on the pre-existing tariff,
which may or may not be optimal. The first-best social optimum can be computed, however, by
noting that it satisfies (4.15) and ensures that G(tM,sP)=0. Bettendorf and Heijdra (1998) derive the
following expressions for tM
F and sP
F:









is fully aimed at exploiting the increasing returns due to Ethier-style productivity effects whereas
the tariff is aimed at fully exploiting national market power (as in the case of exogenous labour
supply discussed above). Note that the expression for the optimal product subsidy does not depend
on any parameters relating to the rest of the world. Indeed, it is not difficult to show that the same
expression also holds for a closed economy.
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The egalitarian welfare effect of a tariff can be further illustrated by eliminating the
domestic distortion due to monopolistic competition from consideration. Indeed, by substituting the
first-best optimal product subsidy, sP
F=h-1, into the expression for G(tM,sP) we obtain:
and it is furthermore possible to prove that ¶tM
S/¶sP>0 around sP=sP
F (see Bettendorf and Heijdra
(1998)).
22 Hence, provided the product subsidy is set at its first-best optimum value, it is always




ggD(1 gD) 1 tM(sT 1)
sT(1 gDtM)
,
the second-best optimal tariff depends positively on the pre-existing product subsidy.
We now return to the simulations reported in Table 3. An interesting conclusion that
emerges from this table is that the prudent use of debt policy allows for a more ambitious trade
policy by spreading the costs and benefits equally over all generations. Take, for example, the third
column in panel (a) of Table 3. The diversity effect is equal to h=1.3, and present generations do
not gain sufficiently to vote in favour of even an introduction of a tariff as s(%)=46.9 for tM=0.
With an egalitarian policy, however, the common gain to all generations is in fact positive
(p=0.333 for tM=0), suggesting that the tariff should be introduced. By shifting some of the benefits
from young and future generations to the older generations, everybody can be made better off. The
same conclusion holds for tM=0.1, and in fact the optimal egalitarian tariff lies somewhere between
tM=0.1 and tM=0.3. The same pattern is observed in the other panels of Table 3.
5. Conclusions
A dynamic overlapping-generations model of a small open economy with monopolistic competition
in the goods market is constructed and analyzed. Industrial policy in the form of an import tariff
reduces output and employment and leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate both in the
impact period and in the new steady state. An increase in the tariff has important intergenerational
distribution effects. Old existing generations gain less than younger existing generations as well as
future generations. The prudent use of bond policy neutralizes these intergenerational inequities and
suggests first-best and second-best optimal tariff rates. The first-best tariff exploits national market
power, but the second-best tariff contains a correction to account for the existence of a potentially
suboptimal product subsidy.
This paper can be extended in a number of different directions. First, by constructing a
two-country version of the present model the optimal tariff issue can be studied both with and
without international coordination. This would lead to a further clarification of the role of domestic
and foreign scale economies and international market power. It would also forge a link with the
strategic trade policy literature mentioned in the introduction. Our paper, like the traditional
literature, strongly suggests that a tariff increase constitutes a beggar-thy-neighbour policy' which
suggests that international cooperation may lead to a lower optimal tariff. Second, it would be
-27-desirable to introduce physical capital as a production factor in the present model. A number of
thorny issues must, however, be confronted in such a generalized model. For example, in the
absence of installation costs physical capital is perfectly mobile, leading to implausible impact and
transition effects. See Giovannini (1988) for such a model. Introducing convex installation costs for
investment solves' this problem for the perfectly competitive case (see Buiter (1987)) but opens
an analytically intractable can of worms in a monopolistically competitive world.
23 The reason is
that making physical capital imperfectly mobile also breaks the symmetry of the model because
incumbent firms and potential entrants face different costs of producing. The former possess
installed capital and hence face lower costs of adjusting their capital stock than the latter, who
must build up their capital stock from scratch. It is conjectured that a number of first insights into
the effect of capital accumulation on our conclusions can nevertheless be obtained by studying a
version of the model in which there is no entry/exit of firms at all.
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-30-Table 1: Short-Run Version of the Model
(T1.1) ˙ V(t) r(t)V(t) RL(t)
(T1.2) ˙ X(t) r(t) a X(t) b(a b) V(t) E(t)F(t) B(t)
(T1.3) r(t) rF ˙ E(t)/E(t)




















(T1.6) eL 1 sP Y(t) W(t)L(t)
(T1.7) (1 eL) 1 sP Y(t) RL(t)
(T1.8) Y(t) CD(t) CFE(t)
sT
(T1.9) CD(t) ggDX(t), E(t) 1 tM(t) CF(t) g(1 gD)X(t), W(t) 1 L(t) (1 g)X(t)
(T1.10) Y(t) W0L(t)
heL








(t) rF ˜ V(t) rFwK ˜ r(t) ˜ RL(t)
(T2.2) ˜ X
.









(t) ˜ F(t) wX (sT 1) ˜ E(t) ˜ CF(t)
(T2.5) r
1





















(T2.6) ˜ L(t) ˜ Y(t) ˜ W(t)
(T2.7) ˜ RL(t) ˜ Y(t)
(T2.8) ˜ Y(t) (1 wX) ˜ CD(t) wXsT ˜ E(t)
(T2.9) ˜ CD(t) ˜ X(t), ˜ CF(t) ˜ CD(t) ˜ E(t) ˜ tM(t), ˜ L(t) wLL ˜ W(t) ˜ X(t)
(T2.10) ˜ Y(t) heL ˜ L(t)
Shares:
wLL (1-L)/L Initial leisure/work ratio.
wK RL/Y Initial share of rental income in national income.
wX ECF/Y Initial share of imports (and exports) in national
income.
Notes: (a) We have used the normalization E=1 and B=F=0 initially. The total (constant)
stock of land equals K=1.
(b) Relationship between shares: wK=(1-eL)(1+sP), wX=(1-gD)/(1+gDtM).Table 3. The Efficiency and Intergenerational Distribution Effects
of an Import Tariff
Panel (a): The effect of the diversity parameter





















































































































































































Note: Parameter values are a=0.02, b=0.06, gD=0.5, eL=0.7, sP=0, sT=3, and wLL=2.0. s(%) is the
percentage of the population (alive at the time of the shock) that does not lose as a result of a
marginal increase in the tariff. The efficiency gain under egalitarian redistributive bond policy
is given by p.Panel (b): The effect of the export elasticity





















































































































































































Note: Parameter values are a=0.02, b=0.06, gD=0.5, eL=0.7, sP=0, h=1.3, and wLL=2.0. s(%) is the
percentage of the population (alive at the time of the shock) that does not lose as a result of a
marginal increase in the tariff. The efficiency gain under egalitarian redistributive bond policy
is given by p.Panel (c): The effect of the trade share





















































































































































































Note: Parameter values are a=0.02, b=0.06, h=1.3, eL=0.7, sP=0, h=1.3, and wLL=2.0. s(%) is the
percentage of the population (alive at the time of the shock) that does not lose as a result of a
marginal increase in the tariff. The efficiency gain under egalitarian redistributive bond policy is
given by p.
-35-Panel (d): The effect of the pre-existing product subsidy





















































































































































































Note: Parameter values are a=0.02, b=0.06, gD=0.5, eL=0.7, h=1.3, sT=3, and wLL=2.0. s(%) is the
percentage of the population (alive at the time of the shock) that does not lose as a result of a
marginal increase in the tariff. The efficiency gain under egalitarian redistributive bond policy
is given by p.
-36-Panel (e): The effect of the export elasticity if the
product subsidy is set optimally























































































































































Note: Parameter values are a=0.02, b=0.06, gD=0.5, eL=0.7, sP=h-1=0.3, h=1.3, and wLL=2.0. s(%) is
the percentage of the population (alive at the time of the shock) that does not lose as a result of
a marginal increase in the tariff. The efficiency gain under egalitarian redistributive bond policy
is given by p.
-37-Footnotes
1. Recent examples include Bovenberg (1993) on investment stimulation measures,
Bovenberg (1994) on capital taxation, as well as Engel and Kletzer (1990) and Galor
(1994) on tariffs. All these papers analyse a small open economy with universal perfect
competition. Bovenberg and Heijdra (1996) analyse environmental taxes in a closed
economy. Bettendorf and Heijdra (1996) use the model of this paper to study the
macroeconomic and distributional effects of a product subsidy. See also the recent study by
Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996).
2. Hence, it is assumed that the Armington substitution elasticity between domestic and
foreign composite consumption goods (say sA) equals unity. This assumption is made for
simplicity. A non-unitary Armington elasticity, sA¹1, does not substantially affect the
arguments in this paper.
3. Hence, it is assumed that domestic and foreign varieties substitute equally well among
themselves. This assumption helps in keeping the model as simple as possible.
4. If g=1, labour supply is exogenous and each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labour.
5. Provided financial wealth is positive, which is ensured throughout the paper. See below.
6. We use the fact that X(t)=(a+b)[A(t)+H(t)] and X(t,t)=(a+b)H(t) in the second step.
7. We include a pre-existing product subsidy to capture the notion that the policy maker may
be engaged in industrial policy aimed at correcting for the monopoly distortions in the
economy. Below we demonstrate the interaction between the optimal tariff and the pre-
existing product subsidy. In Bettendorf and Heijdra (1996) we study the allocation and
welfare effects of the product subsidy.
8. This explains the appearance of the term involving N(t) in (2.20).
9. Free exit and entry implies that average cost curve is tangent to the demand curve. It is
straightforward to show that marginal cost of any active firm (MCi) equals total cost (TCi)
divided by l times gross production (Y ¯+f), i.e., MCi=TCi/l(Y ¯+f). The expressions in (2.16)
imply the usual mark-up pricing rule, i.e., P ¯=µMCi. The tangency condition requires
P ¯=ACi=TCi/Y ¯. Combining these conditions yields the zero pure profit condition µY ¯=l(Y ¯+f).
For obvious reasons, this expression is only meaningful if the markup exceeds the scale
parameter l, i.e. µ>l is assumed throughout the paper. This condition has been used to
derive (T1.10).
10. If the substitution elasticity between broad consumption and leisure (say sCM) is unequal to
unity, the real exchange rate also affects labour supply directly. Indeed, if sCM>1, labour
supply and hence output depend negatively on the real exchange rate, rendering the
aggregate supply curve downward sloping in Figure 1. Nothing of substance is affected by
restricting attention to the Cobb-Douglas case with sCM=1.
11. Note that Y
D does not directly depend on the tariff, tM. If the Armington substitution
elasticity between domestic and foreign composite consumption goods (sA) is unequal to
unity, the tariff also affects aggregate demand directly. Indeed, if sA>1, the home demand
for domestic goods and hence aggregate demand depend positively on the tariff. Nothing of
substance is affected by restricting attention to the Cobb-Douglas case with sA=1.
-38-12. The slope of the MKR curve is ¶X ˜/¶F ˜=1/wK and the slope of the CA curve is ¶X ˜/¶F ˜=1/f.
Hence, since 0<wK<1 and f³1, the MKR locus is steeper than the CA locus.
13. Under perfect competition l=µ=1 and f=0 and the diversity effect is not operative as the
number of firms is not determined in the model. Hence, the perfectly competitive solutions
are obtained from our model by setting h=1 and W0=1. See Heijdra (1994) and Heijdra and
van der Ploeg (1996) for further details.
14. In the representative-agent version of the model, b=0 and rF=a, and only the efficiency
effect remains.
15. Below we give the expressions for the exact transition paths. See equations (3.15)-(3.17).
16. Intuitively, the Laplace transform {x,s} denotes the present value of the time path x(t)







17. We use the fact that X ˜(0)-V ˜(0)/wK>0. A proof for this result is found in Bettendorf and
Heijdra (1998).
18. Despite trying a very wide array of (sometimes very unrealistic) parameter values, we have
been unable to produce a counterexample to the claim that dL(0,0)<dL(¥,¥). See also
Table 3.





2 4bg(a b)wK .
20. These terms of trade gains are needed to create a steady-state deficit on the trade account
in the new steady state. This deficit is covered by interest income received from the rest of
the world. It is tempting (but incorrect) to view the terms of trade effect and the net
foreign asset effect as one and the same thing. It is shown below, however, that it is
socially optimal not to allow present generations to accumulate a net claim on the rest of
the world. It that sense, the terms of trade effect in the absence of bond policy is
excessive', a phenomenon that is represented by the net foreign asset effect.
21. This can be seen by setting gD=1 in (4.15). See also the related paper by Broer and Heijdra
(1996).
22. The numerical simulations in Table 3(d) suggest that ¶tM
*/¶sP>0 may in fact hold globally.
We have been unable to prove this conjecture, however.
23. The installation cost approach to investment has itself been subjected to severe criticism in





















Figure 1. Determination of the real exchange rate 
Key: E is the real exchange rate, Y is aggregate output, Y
D is aggregate demand, Y
S is aggregate
supply, and X is full consumption. A decrease in full consumption, say from X0 to X1, stimulates
labour supply, and the supply curve for goods shifts to the right. Aggregate demand is reduced, as
goods are normal in consumption. At the old real exchange rate E0 there is excess supply of  goods,




















Figure 2. The dynamic effects of an import tariff 
Key: F is net foreign assets, X is full consumption, MKR is the modified Keynes-Ramsey rule, CA is
the current account equilibrium locus, and SP is the saddle path. An increase in the tariff shifts the
long-run equilibrium from e0 to e1, and full consumption and net foreign assets both rise. The
transition path is a jump at impact from e0 to e1, followed by gradual adjustment along the saddle path
SP towards e1. With an egalitarian policy the MKR curve shifts to the left and impact and long-run

























Figure 3. The effects of the tariff on output and the real exchange rate
Key: E is the real exchange rate, Y is aggregate output, Y
D is aggregate demand, Y
S is aggregate
supply, and X is full consumption. With exogenous labour supply (3=1), output is fixed and the tariff
only affects aggregate demand via its effect on full consumption which rises in the long run. The
exchange rate appreciates as the equilibrium shifts from e0 to e1. With endogenous labour supply
(3>1),  there is also a negative effect on the supply of domestic output. The equilibrium shifts from e0
to e2 in that case. 